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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent research on alliance governance has emphasized that contracts can have both a 
control and coordination function. In this paper, we test the impact of these different 
contract functions on alliance performance. Conducting structural equation analyses 
on a sample of 270 Dutch technology alliances, we disentangle the relationship 
between different contract functions, partner cooperation and alliance success. Our 
data show that different contract roles have a different impact on partner cooperation 
within the alliance. In addition, we find strong indications that the presence/absence 
of prior trustful collaboration and the number of alliance partners moderate the 
relationship between contract functions and partner cooperation. Finally, our data 
provide evidence that contract functions indirectly influence alliance success via 
partner cooperation. 
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Contractual Alliance Governance:  
Impact of Different Contract Functions on Alliance Performance 
 
 
Alliances have become an increasingly popular strategy for organizations to 
complement and supplement their internal activities (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Kale & 
Singh, 2009; Hagedoorn, 2002). Although popular, their failure rates are high (Bleeke 
& Ernst, 1991), instigating numerous scholars to study the governance of alliances 
(Faems, Janssens, Madhok & Van Looy, 2008). In this research stream, contracts or 
‘agreements in writing between two or more parties, which are perceived as legally 
binding (Lyons & Mehta, 1997: 241)’ have been identified as an important 
mechanism to effectively govern alliances.  
Whereas alliance contract research has traditionally focused on the complexity 
of the contract (i.e. the amount of clauses in the contract), some scholars (e.g. Faems 
et al., 2008, Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007; Mayer & Teece, 2008; Klein Woolthuis, 
Hillebrand & Nooteboom, 2005) have recently started to also consider the content of 
the contract. In this way, these scholars managed to identify that contracts can both (i) 
allow for formal control of the partner’s behavior; and (ii) facilitate coordinated action 
However, research on the impact of such different contract roles on the performance 
of the alliance has remained absent (de Jong & Klein Woolthuis, 2008).  
In this paper, we therefore explore the impact of different contract functions 
on alliance performance. In order to do so, we rely on a sample of 270 Dutch 
technology alliances. Conducting structural equation analyses, we explore the 
relationships between contract functions, partner cooperation and alliance success. 
Our data provide strong indications that different contract functions can significantly 
influence partner cooperation during the alliance. For instance, we find that the more 
important the contractual control function, the lower the partner cooperation within 
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the alliance. In addition, we find that the presence/absence of trustful prior 
collaboration and the number of alliance partners moderate the relationship between 
contract roles and partner cooperation. In particular, we find that the negative impact 
of the contractual control function on partner cooperation disappears when partners 
share a history of trustful collaboration. In addition, we observe that, in the setting of 
dyadic alliance, the contractual coordination function has a significant negative 
impact on partner cooperation. Finally, our data provide consistent evidence that 
contract roles indirectly influence alliance success via partner cooperation. 
The reminder of this paper is structured in four sections. First, we position our 
study in the existing alliance governance literature. Subsequently, we discuss the 
methodology that we applied to examine the impact of contract functions on alliance 
performance. Next, we present the main findings of our study. Finally, we discuss the 
main theoretical and managerial implication of our findings, discuss the main 
limitations of this study and identify several avenues for future research.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Contractual alliance governance: complexity versus content of the contract 
Whereas alliance governance research has long been dominated by a concern for the 
choice between equity or non-equity structures, scholars have also started focusing on 
the role of specific structural and relational governance mechanisms (Arino & Reuer, 
2005). In this literature stream, contracts have been recognized as an important 
structural governance mechanism. Alliance contract studies (e.g. Anderson & Dekker, 
2005; Luo, 2002; Parkhe, 1993; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Reuer, Arino & Wellewigt, 
2006; Ryall & Sampson, 2006) have mainly focused on the complexity of the contract 
or the amount of clauses that are present in the contract. In particular these studies 
examined 1) the impact of several transactional and relational conditions on the 
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amount of clauses that are present in the contract; 2) the impact of contract 
complexity on alliance performance, and 3) the relationship between contract 
complexity and trust or ‘a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another’ 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998: 395).. However, these studies often 
provided inconsistent results. For instance, whereas some scholars (e.g. Luo, 2002; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002) provided evidence for a complementary relationship between 
contract complexity and trust others (e.g. Lyons & Mehta, 1997; Malhorta & 
Murnighan, 2002) pointed to the existence of a substitutive relationship between these 
structural and relational governance mechanisms. 
 Several scholars (e.g. Faems et al., 2008, Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007; Mayer & 
Teece, 2008; Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand & Nooteboom, 2005) have therefore started 
exploring not only the complexity of the contract, but also the actual content of the 
clauses that are defined in alliance contract. Based on this content-based assessment, 
these scholars came to the conclusion that contracts might play different roles in the 
governance of alliances. Mellewigt, Madhok and Weibel (2008) identify two different 
contract roles. First, in line with insights from transaction cost theory (e.g. 
Williamson, 1985), they emphasize that alliance contracts might have a control role, 
reducing the risk that one of the partners will abuse the alliance for opportunistic 
reasons. Second, in line with organizational theory (e.g. Galbraith, 1977; Thompson, 
1967), they stress that the contract might also contain clauses that facilitate 
coordinated action between the partners. Other scholars have come to similar 
conclusions. Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) argue that contracts might have a 
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safeguarding or coordination function in alliances1. Examining the 88 strategic 
alliances, Reuer and Arino (2007) empirically demonstrate that contractual clauses in 
alliance contracts can have both enforcement and coordination functions.  
Impact of contract roles on alliance performance: A conceptual framework 
Whereas scholars have provided valuable insights into the different functions that 
contracts may have in governing alliances, they remain silent on how these contract 
roles influence alliance performance. Below, we develop a conceptual framework in 
which we (i) link the different contract functions to partner cooperation and alliance 
success and (ii) hypothesize on the potential moderating effects of history of trustful 
collaboration and number of alliance partners (see Figure 1). 
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
 Impact of contractual control function on partner cooperation. One key 
difference between single-firm strategies and interfirm alliances is the uncertainty 
attending the cooperation among partners. When independent firms collaborate 
together, there is the risk of the partner not cooperating in good faith in addition to the 
usual risk of unsatisfactory business performance (Das & Teng, 2001: 253). Applying 
a transaction cost framework, scholars have referred to this kind of behavioral 
uncertainty in terms of opportunistic behavior or ‘seeking self interest with guile’ 
(Williamson, 1985). Opportunistic behavior in alliances is exemplified by ‘cheating, 
shirking, distorting information, misleading partners, providing substandard 
products/services, and appropriating partners’ critical resources’ (Das & Teng, 1998: 
492).  
In line with transaction cost theory, numerous alliance governance scholars 
have argued that alliance partners can negotiate safeguarding clauses, inflicting 
                                                 
1
 Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) identify a third contract role. They stress that contracts may also serve 
as a tangible expression of partners’ trust in each other and their intention to be loyal partners. In other 
words, the contract might also function as a signal of commitment. 
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penalties for the omission of cooperative behaviors or commission of violative 
behaviors (Parkhe, 1993). As a result, the cost of self-interest activities subsequently 
increases, curbing partners’ willingness to act opportunistically (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
In other words, safeguarding clauses allow for formal control or the utilization of 
formal rules, procedures, and policies to monitor and punish undesirable behavior 
and/or outcomes (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Das & Teng, 2001), reducing the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior. First indications are also present that, when the 
contract has a strong control function, knowledge transfer between the partners will 
be more open and transparent. Examining three R&D alliances, Faems, Janssens & 
Van Looy (2007), for instance, observed that, in cases were explicit contractual 
clauses were present that controlled the exchange of knowledge, partners were much 
more willing to disclose sensitive knowledge to the other partner.  
 In sum, we expect that, the more alliance partners rely on contracts as a 
mechanism to control for opportunistic behavior, the lower the probability that 
opportunistic behavior will occur and the higher the willingness to transfer knowledge 
between the partners. We therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The more important the control function of alliance contracts, 
the higher the partner cooperation within the alliance. 
 
 Several scholars have argued that the relevance of the contractual control 
function might be dependent on alliance partners’ history of prior collaboration. When 
partners share a history of successful prior collaboration,  they are likely to have build 
up ‘resilient trust’ or a psychological state between collaborating partners, 
characterized by shared norms, values and beliefs that emphasize faith in the moral 
integrity or goodwill of others (Ring, 1997). Looking from a social exchange 
perspective (e.g. Blau, 1964), several scholars (e.g. Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Das & 
Teng, 1998, 2001; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Jones and George, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 
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1994) argued that the presence of resilient trust influences how partners work together 
in alliances. First, under conditions of resilient trust, ‘shared valued underlying trust 
provide individuals with the assurance that knowledge and information will be used 
for the greater good and that one need not exercise power to protect one’s own 
interests’ (Jones & George, 1998: 542). In other words, when resilient trust is present, 
the perception of opportunistic hazards is likely to be reduced. In the alliance 
literature, these dynamics have been referred to in terms of ‘social control’ (Inkpen & 
Currall, 2004; Das & Teng, 2001). Opposite to formal control, emphasizing rules, 
procedures and policies, social control tries to minimize divergence of preferences 
among participants by relying on the development of shared values, beliefs, and goals 
among members (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). In such circumstances, partners’ 
incentives to behave opportunistically are reduced (Das & Teng, 2001; Dyer & Singh, 
1998).  
In sum, in case of prior trustful collaboration, alliance partners do not need 
formal control because they can rely on social control to mitigate opportunistic 
behavior and stimulate open knowledge exchange. We therefore expect that the 
contractual control function is especially relevant for stimulating partner cooperation 
in settings where a history of trustful prior collaboration is absent:    
Hypothesis 2: The positive impact of the contractual control function on 
partner cooperation is stronger when alliance partners do not share a history 
of trustful collaboration. 
 
In the alliance literature, a distinction is made between dyadic alliances, in 
which only two organizations collaborate, and multilateral alliances, in which the 
collaboration involves more than two partners. Moreover, some scholars (e.g. Garcia-
Canal et al., 2003; Gong, Shenkar, Lou & Nyaw, 2007) provide first indications that 
the impact of the contractual control function on the quality of interaction might differ 
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in dyadic and multilateral alliances. Both Garcia-Canal et al. and Gong et al. (2007) 
provide empirical evidence that, in multilateral alliances, contract complexity has a 
significant positive impact on alliance performance, whereas such a relationship is not 
present in the setting of dyadic alliances. To explain these findings, these scholars 
argue that, the more partners are present in an alliance, the more difficult it becomes 
to monitor the actions of all different parties and to align the partners’ goals. In such a 
setting, partners’ incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior are likely to increase 
(Das & Teng, 2002), which increases the relevance of using the contract as a formal 
control mechanism. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive impact of the contractual control function on 
partner cooperation is stronger in multilateral alliances. 
 
Impact of contractual coordination function on partner cooperation. 
Whereas transaction scholars focus on the behavioral uncertainty of alliances, other 
scholars, applying insights from organization theory (e.g. Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967), emphasize the difficulty of achieving coordinated action in 
alliances. Two main reasons have been mentioned to explain the difficulties of 
coordination in alliance. First, alliances can not make an appeal to all hierarchical 
structures and systems that are available within organizations to achieve coordinated 
action (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Second, differences in national context as well as 
differences in corporate cultures further complicate the coordination between 
collaborating partners (Parkhe, 1991). 
At the same time, the alliance contract has been identified as a viable 
mechanism to improve coordination. In particular, through extensively defining 
performance control systems, action planning systems, and standard operating 
procedures in the formal contract, the division of labor and the interactions between 
partners become more predictable and joint decisions can be made more by rules than 
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by exception (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Mellewigt et al., 2008; Reuer & Arino, 
2007). In other words, a contract allows for standardized coordination (Mintzberg, 
1979), facilitating cooperation between the involved partners: 
Hypothesis 4: The more important the coordination function of alliance 
contracts, the higher the partner cooperation within the alliance. 
 
Based on a longitudinal study of contracting in the personal computer 
industry, Mayer and Argyeres (2004: 394) concluded that contracts may also function 
as ‘repositories for knowledge about how to govern collaborations.’ In particular, they 
argue that when collaborative partners share a history of previous collaboration, they 
are likely to adjust the content of the contract based on their mutual learning 
experiences in their previous collaborative transactions. In addition, Faems et al. 
(2008) empirically illustrate that this contract learning effect is particularly important 
for coordination clauses in the contract. Based on these observations, we expect that, 
when partners share a history of trustful collaboration, they will be able to define in 
the contract more fine-grained coordination clauses, which will reinforce the positive 
impact of contractual coordination function on partner cooperation: 
Hypothesis 5: The positive impact of the contractual coordination function on 
partner cooperation is stronger when alliance partners share a history of 
trustful collaboration. 
 
Focusing on the distinction between dyadic and multilateral alliances, several 
scholars (Das & Teng, 2002; Garcia-Canal et al., 2003; Gong et al., 2007) argue that 
multilateral alliances do not only imply a higher risk of opportunistic behavior, but 
also entail a higher risk of problematic coordination. After all, the more alliance 
partners, the more likely substantial differences will be present in terms of 
organizational culture, structure and strategic vision, which complicate achieving 
coordinated action. At the same time, it is argued that, in dyadic alliances, partners do 
not need standardized coordination, but can rather rely on coordination by mutual 
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adjustment (Mintzberg, 1977). In sum, the relevance of the contractual coordination 
function seems to be higher in multilateral alliances compared to dyadic alliances. We 
therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: The positive impact of the contractual coordination function on 
partner cooperation is stronger in multilateral alliances. 
 
Impact of partner cooperation on alliance success. According to existing 
alliance research (e.g. Dyer & Singh, 1998; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Zajac & 
Olsen, 1993), the extent of partner cooperation has a strong impact on alliance success 
or the degree to which partners manage to realize or even exceed the initial 
expectations. In particular, it is argued that the more cooperative behaviors (e.g. open 
exchange of knowledge between partners, joint sensemaking, joint problem solving) 
are present and the more non-cooperative behaviors (e.g. shirking, stealing 
knowledge, hiding information) are absent, the higher the ability of partners to come 
to synergistic value creation within the alliance. We therefore expect that:     
Hypothesis 7: Higher partner cooperation increases alliance success. 
METHODOLOGY 
Research design and sample 
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of Dutch firms that participated in 
technology alliances. The sample was constructed with the help of Senter Novem, an 
agency of the Dutch ministry of Economic affairs. The main goal of Senter Novem is 
to support the development and innovation activities of Dutch firms on both domestic 
and international markets. Among other things, Senter Novem manages a funding 
scheme (i.e. WBSO) that allows firms, knowledge institutes, and individuals to 
receive tax compensation for technological innovation projects. The research sample 
for this studies consists of firms that (i) made use of this particular funding scheme for 
technological innovation project, (ii) indicated that they formally collaborated with 
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other partners for this particular innovation project, and (iii) indicated that this 
particular innovation project was recently finished or was in the final stage of being 
finished. The initial sample consisted of 648 firms that had filed for tax compensation 
for a particular technological innovation project in 1999. 391 organizations eventually 
responded to the survey. Because of missing values on the variables that we 
constructed, the size of our sample was further restricted. In total, the sample of this 
study consists of 270 collaborative innovation projects. Table 1 gives some additional 
information about the survey response rate.  
----- Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
An external research organization was made responsible for the data collection 
phase. This research organization made use of telephone surveys to collect the needed 
information. The responding firms were active in the areas of: biotechnology, new 
materials, information technology, maritime technologies, chemicals, and 
environmental technologies. 
Measures 
 Contract roles. Whereas previous alliance contract research has focused on 
measuring the complexity of the contract through counting the number of contractual 
clauses or evaluating the presence/absence of a set of predefined contractual clauses, 
we wanted to measure to which extent respondents used the contract as a control 
and/or coordination mechanism. In order to do so, we asked respondents to indicate 
on a five point Likert scale (i.e. 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) (i) whether 
the contract functioned as a guarantee against opportunistic behavior of the other 
partner(s), and (ii) whether the contract functioned as a plan of action in order to 
streamline the collaboration. The scores on these items were used to measure the 
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importance of the contractual control function and the contractual coordination 
function. 
 Partner cooperation. In line with Luo (2002) and Gong et al. (2007), we 
measured partner cooperation through evaluating the absence or presence of specific 
cooperative situations. In particular, we asked respondents to rate on a 5 point Liker 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) the degree to which three cooperative 
situations and two non-cooperative situations characterized the relationship among 
partners (see Table 2). Subsequently, we conducted an explorative factor analysis, 
indicating that all items loaded on one single factor (see Table 2). In line with our 
expectations, the cooperative situations loaded positively on this factor, whereas the 
non-cooperative situations loaded negatively on this factor. Next, we relied on the 
standardized factor score for each case to construct the variable ‘partner cooperation.’ 
----- Insert Table 2 about here ----- 
Alliance success. Alliance scholars (e.g. Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Arino, 
2003) have provided evidence that subjective measures of alliance success highly 
correlate with objective measures of success. Following previous alliance research 
(e.g. Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Gong et al., 2007) we adopt a multidimensional 
approach to measure alliance success. We asked respondents to rate on a 5 point 
Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree) the following three aspects: (i) the 
project has become a technological success; (ii) the project has lead to lower 
development costs than if we would have done the project alone or if we would have 
done the project with another partner; (iii) the result of the collaboration has exceeded 
my expectations. Subsequently, we conducted an explorative factor analysis, 
indicating that all items loaded on one single factor (see Table 3). Next, we relied on 
the standardized factor score for each case to construct the variable ‘alliance success.’ 
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----- Insert Table 3 about here ----- 
History of trustful collaboration. Previous alliance research (e.g. Garcia-
Canal et al., 2003; Gulati, 1995; Mellewigt et al., 2008) has relied on the presence of 
prior collaboration as an indicator of resilient trust. However, these studies ignore that 
prior collaboration might have been unsuccessful, which might even trigger negative 
trust dynamics (Faems et al., 2008). In this study, we therefore rely on a more fine-
grained measure of prior collaboration. In particular, we asked respondents whether a 
friendly connection already existed before the project. Based on this question, we 
constructed a dummy variable, representing the absence (value = 0) or presence 
(value =1) of ‘prior trustful collaboration.’ In our sample 176 (65.2%) of the observed 
alliances had a history of trustful collaboration.  
Number of alliance partners. In the survey, respondents had to indicate the 
amount of partners that were involved in the alliance. Based on this information, we 
constructed a dummy variable ‘number of alliance partners’, representing the 
difference between dyadic alliances (value = 0) and multilateral alliances (value = 1). 
In our sample 96 (35.6%) alliances were of a dyadic nature whereas 174 (64.4%) were 
of a multilateral nature. 
Contract complexity. Although we focus in this study on the different 
functions of the contract, we also wanted to control for contract complexity. In line 
with previous alliance contract research (e.g. Parkhe, 1993; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; 
Reuer & Arino, 2007), we therefore provided respondents with a list of 13 specific 
contractual clauses and asked them to indicate whether or these contractual clauses 
were present in the contract. Based on this information, we constructed the variable 
contract complexity, representing the sum of these 13 items. 
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Alliance objectives. Firms can rely on collaboration with external partners for 
both explorative and exploitative innovation projects (Faems et al., 2005; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Explorative innovation projects refer 
to projects in which the focus is on fundamental research in order to generate new 
technological capabilities. Exploitative innovation projects are defined as projects in 
which the focus is on applied research in order to leverage existing technological 
capabilities. In the alliance literature (e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2003; Koza & 
Lewin, 1998; Faems et al., 2006) first indications have been provided that explorative 
and exploitative collaborations are characterized by different interaction patterns and 
have different success rates. We therefore wanted to control for the objective of the 
collaboration in our analyses. In the survey, we asked respondents to indicate whether 
the collaborative innovation project was (i) very fundamental; (ii) rather fundamental; 
(iii) in the middle between fundamental and applied research; (iv) rather applied; (v) 
very applied. Based on this information, we constructed the variable ‘Exploitative 
orientation.’   
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and analyses 
Table 4 gives an overview of the most important descriptive statistics. This table 
shows the presence of a significant positive correlation between the contractual 
control function and the contractual coordination function. This indicates that alliance 
partners can simultaneously apply the contract as a mechanism to safeguard against 
opportunistic behavior and, at the same time, rely on it as a tool to facilitate 
coordinated action. 
----- Insert Table 4 about here ---- 
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To test the hypotheses, we used structural equation modeling (SEM) with 
manifest variables. Compared to ordinary linear regression models, this technique has 
two advantages (Sels et al., 2006). First, the method enables to define and test 
hypothesized relationships between variables. The output indicates whether the model 
is supported by the data as a whole and gives a significance test for the various 
individual relationships. Second, a variable in a SEM model can either be dependent 
or independent. This allows testing the indirect influence, if any, of certain variables. 
 We relied on the Calis procedure in the SAS software package to conduct our 
SEM analyses. First, we analyzed the relationship between contract functions, partner 
cooperation and alliance success on the full sample. In this model, we did not take 
into account the potential moderating impact of history of trustful collaboration and 
number of alliance partners. Instead, we integrated these latter variables as control 
variables in addition to contract complexity and exploitative orientation. 
Subsequently, we did split the full sample based on the variable ‘history of trustful 
collaboration’ in order to test the moderating impact of it. After splitting the sample 
we ran one SEM analysis for the cases that lacked a history of trustful collaboration 
and one analysis for the cases that were characterized by the presence of prior trustful 
collaboration. A similar procedure was conducted to test the moderating impact of the 
number of alliance partners. In all models, we programmed the existence of a 
significant correlation between the contractual control function and the contractual 
coordination function. The goodness-of-fit overview (see Table 5) indicates that the 
different analyzed models were adequately supported by the data.  
----- Insert Table 5 about here ----- 
Below we interpret and explain the effects. First, we look at the effect of the 
contractual control function on partner cooperation. Second, we assess the impact of 
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the contractual coordination function on partner cooperation. Third, we evaluate the 
indirect effect of these contract functions on alliance success via partner cooperation. 
Fourth, we discuss the impact of our control variables. For the different models, the 
standardized path coefficients are listed in Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9, and 
Table 10. The results are also represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The control 
variables have been omitted in this graphical representations in order not to overload 
the figures. 
----- Insert Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10 about here ----- 
----- Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here ----- 
Impact of contractual control function on partner cooperation 
In our first hypothesis, we expected a positive impact of the importance of the control 
function of the contract on partner cooperation. Our findings in model 1 (see Table 6 
and Figure 2), however, suggest the existence of a significant negative effect of the 
contractual control function on partner cooperation. This means that, the more the 
contract was used as a mechanisms to control the behavior of the partners, the less 
(more) likely (non)-cooperative behaviors were to emerge within the alliance.  
In hypothesis 2, we also expected a moderation effect of the presence of prior 
trustful collaboration. Model 2 and Model 3 (see Table 7, Table 8 and Figure 3) 
provide strong indications that prior trustful collaboration indeed moderates the 
relationship between the contractual control function and partner cooperation. In 
particular, we observe that the significant negative impact of the contractual control 
function on partner cooperation disappears when a history of prior collaboration is 
present.  
Finally, we also find that the number of alliance partners has a moderating 
impact on the relationship between contractual control function and partner 
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cooperation. However, whereas we expected in hypothesis 3 that the contractual 
control function has a more positive impact on partner cooperation in the setting of a 
multilateral alliance, Model 5 (see Table 10 and Figure 3) points to a significant 
negative impact of the contractual control function on partner cooperation in this 
particular setting, At the same time, Model 4 (see Table 9 and Figure 3) indicates that 
the contractual control function has no impact on partner cooperation in dyadic 
alliances.    
Impact of contractual coordination function on partner cooperation 
In contrast to our hypothesis 4, we do not find a significant impact of the contractual 
coordination function on partner cooperation for the full sample (see Table 6 and 
Figure 2). In addition, we do not find that the relationship between the contractual 
coordination function and partner cooperation is moderated by the presence or 
absence of prior trustful collaboration (see Table 7, Table 8 and Figure 3). At the 
same time, we find strong indications that the number of alliance partners moderates 
the relationship between contractual coordination function and partner cooperation 
(see Table 9, Table 10 and Figure 3). Whereas Model 5 indicates that the contractual 
coordination function has no significant impact on partner cooperation in multilateral 
alliances, Model 4 points to a significant negative impact of the contractual 
coordination function on partner cooperation in dyadic alliances.   
Impact of partner cooperation on alliance success 
In line with hypothesis 7, we find in all different models a significant positive impact 
of partner cooperation on alliance success. This significant effect also implies the 
existence of some indirect effects between the contractual control/coordination 
function and alliance success in different models. An overview of these indirect 
effects can be found in Table 11. This overview of the indirect effects shows that the 
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actual impact of the contractual control/coordination functions on alliance success is 
close to zero or negative.  
----- Insert Table 11 about here ----- 
Impact of control variables 
In the different models, we controlled for contract complexity, exploitation 
orientation, presence of prior trustful collaboration and number of alliance partners. 
For the full sample, we observe that multilateral alliance have a significant higher 
alliance success rate than dyadic alliances (see Table 6). If we only consider the 
alliances in which a history of trustful collaboration is lacking, this positive effect of 
multilateral alliances on alliance success becomes even more pronounced (see Table 
7). At the same time, we do not find a significant effect of the number of alliance 
partners on alliance success for alliance that are characterized by a history of trustful 
collaboration (see Table 8). 
 In the full sample, we do not find an effect of exploitation orientation on 
alliance success (see Table 6). However, we also observe that exploitation orientation 
has a positive impact on alliances success for 1) alliances that are characterized by a 
history of trustful collaboration (see Table 8) and 2) dyadic alliances (Table 9). In 
other words, we find that the impact of the exploitation orientation on alliance success 
depends on the presence/absence of prior trustful collaboration and the number of 
alliance partners. 
 Previous studies (e.g Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002) have examined the 
impact of contract complexity on alliance success. However, our study indicates that, 
when we also consider the actual functions of the contract, the explanatory value of 
contract complexity becomes rather low. We only find a significant negative effect of 
contract complexity of partner cooperation for alliances in which partners lack a 
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history of trustful collaboration. In the other models, no significant impact of contract 
complexity on partner cooperation or alliance success was observed. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this section, we first discuss our main findings. Subsequently, we present their 
main managerial implications. Finally, we point to the main limitations of this study 
and suggest interesting avenues for future research. 
Contractual control function and partner cooperation 
Previous research has provided evidence that, in settings were the risk of 
opportunistic behavior is high (e.g. high asset specificity, high uncertainty), alliance 
partners are likely to negotiate more complex contracts (Parkhe, 1993) and are likely 
to pay more attention to control clauses in such contracts (Reuer & Arino, 2007). 
Based on these findings and in line with transaction cost theory, these scholars 
pointed to contracts as an important control mechanism in alliance settings.  
In this study, we actually tested the impact of this contractual control function 
on partner cooperation. In contrast to our expectations, we found that the more 
important the contractual control function, the less (more) likely (non)-cooperative 
behaviors are to emerge in alliances. This unexpected result can be explained in 
different ways. A first explanation might be that when partners pay a lot of attention 
to negotiating control clauses, they actually signal to each other that they expect the 
manifestation of opportunistic or non-cooperative behavior. Subsequently, it might be 
that partners will act in line with these initial expectations, engaging in opportunistic 
actions. In other words, negotiation of control clauses might function as a self-
fulfilling prophecy were the announcement of the risk of opportunistic behavior will 
indeed become true.  
  21 
A second potential explanation is that, when partners emphasize the control 
function of the contract, they actually create a foundation of distrust. In such a setting, 
it might be that alliance partners are more likely to link the emergence setbacks during 
the alliance to the endogenous behavior of the other partner (i.e. opportunistic action) 
instead of attributing such negative events to exogenous conditions. Our observation 
that the negative impact of the contractual control function on alliance contracts 
disappears when partners share a history of prior trustful collaboration seems to 
support this latter reasoning. 
Contractual coordination function and partner cooperation 
Adopting insights from organization theory, several scholars (e.g. Mellewigt et al., 
2008; Reuer & Arino, 2007) have stressed that contracts can not only used as a formal 
control mechanisms, but can also be used as a mechanism to facilitate coordinated 
action. Our analyses, however, suggest that the actual impact of the contractual 
coordination function on partner cooperation is quite limited. This result might 
suggest that contractual coordination clauses mainly have an informational purpose 
(i.e. they inform partners about how they will perform the tasks), but do not really 
have a facilitating impact (i.e. they do not really stimulate more cooperative 
behavior).  
In addition, we observe a significant negative effect of the contractual 
coordination function on partner cooperation in the particular setting of dyadic 
alliances. This latter finding might be explained by the fact that the standardized 
coordination, which is imposed on the alliance via contractual coordination clauses, 
might actually obstruct the emergence of coordination by mutual adjustment that is 
easily established in dyadic alliances.  
Managerial implications 
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In the alliance governance literature, numerous scholars have argued that, when 
managers are able to adjust the complexity of the contract to the transactional and 
relational conditions in which the alliance is embedded, the contract can have a 
positive impact on the success of the alliance. Based on our findings, we rather 
caution managers for the potential negative impact of contracts on the success of 
alliances. In particular, we emphasize that negotiating a strong contractual control 
function is likely to have a negative impact on alliance performance especially when 
no history of trustful collaboration is present. In addition, we warn for the use of 
contracts as mechanisms for achieving standardized coordination in the setting of 
dyadic alliances.  
Limitations and future research 
Although the goodness-of-fit of the tested models turns out to be very satisfactory, 
there is a lot of potential to improve the explanatory power of the models. For 
instance, we only could find significant effects of the contractual functions on partner 
cooperation, whereas all the control variables did not have a significant impact on this 
variable. These results suggest that there are other transactional and/or relational 
characteristics that determine the level of (non)-cooperative behaviors during the 
alliance. A more fine-grained assessment of the determinants of partner cooperation in 
alliances therefore seems to be necessary.   
 Our research was situated in a very particular setting. More specifically, we 
focused on subsidized technological innovation projects in which different firms were 
involved. This particular setting might limit the generalizability of our findings. 
Additional survey research on the impact of contractual functions on performance in 
other interfirm settings therefore seems to be necessary. 
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A final limitation of our study was that we could only survey one partner of 
the alliance. However, it might be that different partners have different opinions about 
the function of the contract, the nature of partner cooperation and the success of the 
alliance. We therefore encourage future research on alliance governance that 
incorporates the opinions of all involved partners. 
Despite these limitations, this study has triggered first insights in how different 
contractual functions influence alliance performance. We hope that our findings might 
help alliance managers in optimizing their contractual governance strategies. In 
addition, we hope that our insights might motivate other scholars to further examine 
the governance of interfirm relationship in a wide variety of organizational settings.  
  24 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, S. W. & Dekker, H. C. 2005. Management control for market transactions: 
The relation between transaction characteristics, incomplete contract design, and 
subsequent performance. Management Science, 51: 1734-1752. 
Ariño, A. & Reuer, J.J. 2005. Alliance contractual design. In O. Shenkar, & J.J. Reuer 
(Eds.)  Handbook of Strategic Alliances, 149-167. Sage. 
Ariño, A. 2003. Measures of strategic alliance performance: An analysis of construct 
validity. Journal of International Business Studies, 34: 66-79. 
Bijlsma-Frankema, K. & Costa, A. C. 2005. Understanding the trust-control nexus. 
International Sociology, 30:259-282. 
Blau, P. 1964. Exchange and power in social life. John Wiley & Sons, New York 
Bleeke, J. & Ernst, D. 1991. The way to win in cross-border alliances. Harvard 
Business Review, November-December: 127-135. 
Das, T. K. & Teng, B-S. 1998. Between trust and control: Developing confidence in 
partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of Management Review, 23: 491-512. 
Das, T. K. & Teng, B.S. 2001. Trust, control, and risk in strategic alliances: an 
integrated framework. Organization Studies, 22: 251-283. 
Das, T. K. & Teng, B-S. 2002. Alliance constellations: a social exchange perspective, 
Academy of Management Review, 27: 445-456. 
De Jong, G. & Klein Woolthuis, R.J.A. 2008. Contract research and high-tech 
alliances: Vistas for future studies. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 24: 
284-289. 
  25 
Doz, Y. & Hamel, G. 1998. Alliance advantage: The art of creating value through 
partnering. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Dyer, J. H. & Singh, H. 1998. The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 
660-679. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1985. Control: organizational and economic approaches. 
Management Science, 31: 134-149. 
Faems, D., Janssens, M., Bouwen, R. & Van Looy, B. 2006. Governing explorative 
R&D alliances: Searching for effective strategies. Management Revue, 17: 9-29. 
Faems, D., Janssens, M., Madhok, A. & Van Looy, B. 2008. Towards an integrative 
perspective on alliance governance: Connecting contract design, contract 
application and trust dynamics. Academy of Management Journal, 51: 1053-
1078. 
Faems, D., Janssens, M. & Van Looy, B. 2007. The initiation and evolution of 
interfirm knowledge transfer in R&D relationships. Organization Studies, 28: 
1699-1728. 
Faems, D., Van Looy, B. & Debackere, K. 2005. Interorganizational collaboration 
and innovation: toward a portfolio approach. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 22: 238-250. 
Galbraith, J.R. 1977. Organization design. Reading: Addison-Wesley. 
Garcia-Canal, E., Valdés-Llaneza, A. & Arino, A. 2003. Effectiveness of dyadic and 
multi-party joint ventures. Organization Studies, 24: 743-770. 
Geringer, J.M. & Herbert, L. 1991. Measuring performance of international joint 
ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 22: 249-264. 
  26 
Gong, Y., Shenkar, O., Luo, Y., & Nyaw, M-K. 2007. Do multiple parents help or 
hinder international joint venture performance? The mediating roles of contract 
completeness and partner cooperation. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 1021-
1034. 
Gulati, R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for 
contracutal choice in alliances. Academy of Management Review, 38: 85-112. 
Gulati, R. & Singh, H. 1998. The architecture of cooperation: managing coordination 
costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 43: 781-814. 
Hagedoorn, J. 2002. Inter-firm R&D partnerships: an overview of major trends and 
patterns since 1960. Research Policy, 31: 477-492.  
Hagedoorn, J. & Hesen, G. 2007. Contract law and the governance of inter-firm 
technology partnerships: An analysis of different modes of partnering and their 
contractual implications. Journal of Management Studies, 44: 342-366. 
Inkpen, A. C. & Currall, S.C. 2004. The coevolution of trust, control, and learning in 
joint ventures. Organization Science, 15: 586-599. 
Jones, G. R. & George, J.M. 1998. The experience and evolution of trust: implications 
for cooperation and teamwork. Academy of Management Review, 23: 531-546. 
Kale, P. & Singh, H. 2009. Managing strategic alliances: What do we know now, and 
where do we go from here. Academy of Management Perspectives: 45-62. 
Klein Woolthuis, R., Hillebrand, B. & Nooteboom, B. 2005. Trust, contract and 
relationship development. Organization Studies, 26: 813-840. 
  27 
Koza, M. P. & Lewin, A.Y. 1998. The co-evolution of strategic alliances. 
Organization Science, 9: 255-264. 
Lavie, D. & Rosenkopf, L. 2006. Balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance 
formation. Academy of Management Journal, 49: 797-819. 
Lawrence, P.R. & Lorsch, J.W. 1967. Organization and environment. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press.  
Luo, Y. 2002. Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures, 
Strategic Management Journal, 23: 903-919. 
Lyons, B. & Mehta, J. 1997. Contracts, opportunism and trust: Self-interest and social 
orientation. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 21: 239-257. 
Madhok, A. & Tallman, S.B. 1998. Resources, transactions and rents: managing value 
through interfirm collaborative relationships. Organization Science, 9: 326-339. 
Malhorta, D. & Murnighan, J.K. 2002. The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47: 534-559. 
Mayer, K. J. & Argyres, N.S. 2004. Learning to contract: evidence from the personal 
computer industry. Organization Science, 15: 394-410. 
Mayer, K.J. & Teece, D.J. 2008. Unpacking strategic alliances: The structure and 
purpose of alliance versus supplier relationships. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 66: 106-127. 
Mellewigt, T., Madhok, A. & Weibel, A. 2007. Trust and formal contracts in 
interorganizational relationships – substitutes and complements. Managerial and 
Decision Economics. 
  28 
Mintzberg, H. 1979. The structuring of organizations: a synthesis of the research. 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs. 
Ouchi, W.G. 1979. A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control 
mechanisms. Management Science, 25: 833-848. 
Parkhe, A. 1991. Interfirm diversity, organizational learning, and longevity in global 
strategic alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, 22: 579-601. 
Parkhe, A. 1993. Strategic alliances structuring: a game theoretic and transaction cost 
examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 36: 
794-829. 
Poppo, L. & Zenger, T. 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function 
as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23, 707-725. 
Reuer, J.J. & Ariño, A. 2007. Strategic alliance contracts: Dimensions and 
determinants of contractual complexity. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 313-
330. 
Reuer, J. J., Arino, A. & Mellewigt, T. 2006. Entrepreneurial alliances as contractual 
forms. Journal of Business Venturing, 21: 306-325. 
Ring, P.S. 1997. Processes facilitating reliance on trust in inter-organizational 
networks. In M. Ebers (Ed.) The formation of inter-organizational networks. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ring, P. S. & Van De Ven, A.H. 1994. Developmental processes of cooperative 
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19: 90-118. 
  29 
Rothaermel, F. T. & Deeds, D.L. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: a system of new product development. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25, 201-221. 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S.B., Burt, R.S. & Camerer, C. 1998. Not so different after 
all: a cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23: 393-
404. 
Ryall, M. D. & Sampson, R. C. 2006. Do prior alliances influence alliance contract 
structure? In: Arino, A. & Reuer, J.J. (eds.) Strategic alliances: Governance and 
contracts. IESE Business School. 
Sels, L., De Winne, S., Maes, J., Delmotte, J., Faems, D. & Forrier, A. 2006. 
Unraveling the HRM-Performance link: value-creating and cost-increasing 
effects of small business HRM. Journal of Management Studies, 43: 319-342. 
Thompson, J. D. 1967. Organizations in action. New York: Mc Graw-Hill. 
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The 
Free Press. 
Zajac, E. J. & Olsen, C.P. 1993. From transaction cost to transactional value analysis: 
implications for the study of interorganizational strategies. Journal of 
Management Studies, 30: 131-145. 
 
 
 
  30 
Table 1: Overview Sampling Procedure 
Initial Sample 648 firms 
Unable to come in 
contact with project 
leader 
24 firms 
Double address in 
database 18 firms 
Project leader has quitted 
the company 6 firms 
Not a cooperative project 28 firms 
Total base for response 572 firms 
Unable to locate project 
leader during data 
collection phase 
115 firms 
Respondent only wants 
to answer in written form 6 firms 
Respondent does not 
want to cooperate for 
various reasons 
60 firms 
Total response rate 391 firms (68.5%) 
Missing values on 
constructs 121 firms 
Final sample 270 firms 
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Table 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis on Partner Cooperation 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Table 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis on Alliance Success 
 
 
 Factor 
loadings 
We and our partner always talked openly 
and informally about our ideas, feelings, 
and wishes 
0.522 
We and our partner always gave each 
other all information that is relevant for 
the project 
0.874 
We and our partner could openly criticize 
each other when this contributes to the 
execution of the project 
0.601 
Our partner tried to get more advantages 
from the project than could be justified 
based on her efforts 
-0.684 
Our partner kept important information 
hidden for us -0.788 
 Factor 
loadings 
the project has become a technological 
success 
0.715 
the project has lead to lower development 
costs than if we would have done the 
project alone or if we would have done 
the project with another partner 
0.640 
the result of the collaboration has 
exceeded my expectations 0.748 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
(* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level) 
 
Variable Mean S 
Partner 
cooperation 
Alliance 
success 
Contractual 
coordination 
function 
Contractual 
control function 
Exploitation 
orientation 
Partner cooperation 0.00 1.00 1     
Alliance success 0.00 1.00 0.217*** 1    
Contractual 
coordination function 3.34 1.66 -0.027 0.033 1   
Contractual control 
function 2.03 1.46 -0.150* -0.077 0.145* 1  
Exploitation 
orientation 3.56 1.23 -0.057 0.075 -0.022 -0.118 1 
Contract complexity 9.17 2.81 -0.034 0.065 0.048 0.213** -0.290 
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Table 5: Goodness-of-fit measures 
 
Model 1:  
Full sample 
(n =270) 
 
Model 2:  
No history of 
trustful 
collaboration 
(n = 94) 
Model 3:  
History of trustful 
collaboration 
(n = 186) 
Model 4:  
Dyadic alliances 
(n = 96) 
Model 5: 
Multilateral 
alliances 
(n = 184) 
Bentler’s Comparative Fit index 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Bentler and Bonett’s Non-normed index 1.26 1.00 0.99 1.09 1.27 
Bentler and Bonett’s Normed Fit index 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Chi-Square test (p-value) 0.68 0.37 0.36 0.48 0.60 
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Table 6: Standardized path coefficients Model 1: Full sample  
(†p<0.10; *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
 
Path from / to (3) (4) 
  (1) Contractual control function -0.14*  
  (2) Contractual coordination function -0.01  
  (3) Partner cooperation  0.22*** 
  (4) Alliance success   
Control variables   
  (6) Exploitation orientation -0.08 0.10 
  (7) Contract complexity -0.03 0.10 
  (8) History of trustful collaboration 0.05 0.02 
  (9) Multilateral collaboration 0.04 0.14* 
 
Table 7: Standardized path coefficients Model 2: No history of trustful 
collaboration (†p<0.10; *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
 
Path from / to (3) (4) 
  (1) Contractual control function -0.20**  
  (2) Contractual coordination function -0.01  
  (3) Partner cooperation  0.20** 
  (4) Alliance success   
Control variables   
  (6) Exploitation orientation -0.11 0.01 
  (7) Contract complexity -0.16* 0.07 
  (8) History of trustful collaboration   
  (9) Multilateral collaboration -0.02 0.22** 
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Table 8: Standardized path coefficients Model 3: History of trustful 
collaboration (†p<0.10; *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
 
Path from / to (3) (4) 
  (1) Contractual control function -0.09  
  (2) Contractual coordination function -0.03  
  (3) Partner cooperation  0.23*** 
  (4) Alliance success   
Control variables   
  (6) Exploitation orientation -0.05 0.16* 
  (7) Contract complexity 0.07 0.10 
  (8) History of trustful collaboration   
  (9) Multilateral collaboration 0.08 0.10 
 
Table 9: Standardized path coefficients Model 4: Dyadic alliances 
(†p<0.10; *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
 
Path from / to (3) (4) 
  (1) Contractual control function -0.11  
  (2) Contractual coordination function -0.19**  
  (3) Partner cooperation  0.26*** 
  (4) Alliance success   
Control variables   
  (6) Exploitation orientation -0.03 0.21** 
  (7) Contract complexity 0.04 0.06 
  (8) History of trustful collaboration 0.00 0.08 
  (9) Multilateral collaboration   
 
  36 
Table 10: Standardized path coefficients Model 5: Multilateral alliances 
(†p<0.10; *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
 
Path from / to (3) (4) 
  (1) Contractual control function -0.17*  
  (2) Contractual coordination function 0.09  
  (3) Partner cooperation  0.20** 
  (4) Alliance success   
Control variables   
  (6) Exploitation orientation -0.10 0.03 
  (7) Contract complexity -0.04 0.11 
  (8) History of trustful collaboration 0.09 -0.02 
  (9) Multilateral collaboration   
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Table 11: Indirect of contractual functions on alliance success 
 
 
Model 1:  
Full sample 
(n =270) 
 
Model 2:  
No history of 
trustful 
collaboration 
(n = 94) 
Model 3:  
History of 
trustful 
collaboration 
(n = 186) 
Model 4:  
Dyadic alliances 
(n = 96) 
Model 5: 
Multilateral 
alliances 
(n = 184) 
Contractual 
control 
function 
-0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Contractual 
coordination 
function 
0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
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Figure 2: Result for Full sample (†p<0.10; *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
Contractual control
function
Contractual coordination
function
Partner
cooperation
Alliance
success
0.22***
-0.14*
-0.01 n.s.
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Figure 3: Results for Split samples (†p<0.10; *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
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